Article: Mideast Nuclear Power

The Times November 04, 2006

Treaty is left in shreds by new race
World Briefing by Bronwen Maddox

IT IS not possible to deny Arab states help with building nuclear power stations without shattering the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The short answer as to whether there is a diplomatic way to persuade them not to go down this route is no, if they are determined.

There is no question, too, that it will add to military tensions in the region.

Even though their avowed aim is to build nuclear power stations, that could put them within easy reach of weapons, depending on the skills they intend to acquire.

Western diplomats know that any long-term attempt to contain this threat may have to involve discussion of Israel’s presumed nuclear weapons, something that Arab nations have long wanted to be part of talks on regional security, despite resistance from the US and Israel.

On the face of it, the request by the Arab countries to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is entirely reasonable.

They are all signatories to the non-proliferation treaty under which they have a right to ask for help in developing civil nuclear power.

They also make the sensible case that they need more energy resources for water desalination, which is essential to their economic development. The worry about possible military aspirations stems partly from the timing.

Iran has so far escaped lightly from ploughing ahead with its nuclear plans; Russia has been particularly resistant to United Nations sanctions against it.

The extent of the UN punishment that will be inflicted on North Korea for its recent nuclear test is also unclear.

Iran and North Korea have advertised the great weakness of the treaty: that a country developing civil nuclear power — entirely legitimately and under IAEA supervision — can take itself very close to military capability.

If it masters uranium enrichment, the tricky process needed to make fuel for reactors, then it has also mastered the most difficult step in making fissile material for bombs.

It can then break out of the treaty (as North Korea has indeed done, although Iran has not), and race for its ultimate goal.

The central question is how the Arab countries intend to develop their civil nuclear power. If they insist on doing their own enrichment, then the IAEA is set for some difficult talks about how to supervise it.

The agency will want to insist that the countries sign the “additional protocol” for inspections, which authorise it to make surprise visits to sites of its own choosing. The IAEA has tried to make this protocol the standard, to remedy some of the flaws of the treaty, but some countries have refused to sign it.

But it would be hard for the IAEA to refuse help. Under its mandate it is obliged to help countries acquire civil nuclear power, provided their intentions are peaceful.

Much of the objection to Iran’s programme is that it was hidden for 20 years, and revealed by dissidents. These countries appear, at least, to be acting in good faith in announcing their intentions up front.

Diplomatic efforts are likely to begin by trying to persuade them to buy in their nuclear fuel from other sources.

That would allow them to have as much nuclear power as they wanted, but would prevent them from mastering enrichment.

Iran has refused this kind of deal, urged on it by European countries and Russia, which has offered to supply the fuel and take back the waste afterwards.

In the longer term, these Arab countries may well try to capitalise on the West’s concern about a nuclear arms race.

They may well ask the West to bring pressure on Israel to declare its nuclear capabilities, a long-held grievance, in return for their support in leaning on Iran, or for curbing their own ambitions.